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This paper shows that the optimal steady-state tax on capital income in a neoclassical growth 
model can be positive, negative, or zero, depending crucially on the level of  monopoly profits and the 
degree to which profits can be taxed. With an empirically plausible level of profits, the model implies 
that the optimal steady-state tax on capital can range between -6 percent and 24 percent, depending on 
the structure of dividend taxation. Similarly, we find that the available welfare gain of switching from 
the existing U.S. tax policy to a revenue-neutral optimal tax policy can range between 0.8 percent and 
3.9 percent of  steady-state output. 
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An important issue for U.S. policymakers is whether capital gains should be taxed as ordinary 
income (as they are now) or be given some form of tax-favored treatment. Judd (1985) and Chamley 
(1986) show that, in the long run, the standard neoclassical growth model implies that capital income 
should not be taxed at all, that is, the optimal steady-state tax on capital income is zero. Based on this 
result, other researchers, such as Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992), and McGrattan, Rogerson, 
and Wright (1993) estimate that there exist large unexploited gains to eliminating the U.S. capital tax. 
In this paper, we augment the standard model to allow for the possibility of  monopoly profits 
and show that the optimal steady-state tax on capital income can be positive, negative, or zero. The 
optimal tax rate depends crucially on the level of monopoly profits and the degree to which profits can 
be taxed. In particular, we adopt a model of the production environment developed by Benhabib and 
Farmer (1994) in which producers of intermediate goods possess a degree of monopoly power that can 
be characterized by a single parameter. The model embeds the perfect competition environment assumed 
by  Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) as a special case. 
The consideration of monopoly power introduces two competing effects that interact to determine 
the optimal  steady-state tax on capital income. First, households underinvest relative to the socially 
optimal level because the interest rate that governs their investment decisions is less than the marginal 
product of capital. This "underinvestment effect" represents the classic inefficiency of a monopoly, and 
results in lower long-run levels of capital and output in comparison to the perfectly competitive case. 
To correct this inefficiency, the government can subsidize capital accumulation (and stimulate output) 
by  imposing a negative tax rate on capital income. 
The second effect derives from the fact that fms  with monopoly power earn pure economic 
profits. Since profits do not affect household decisions at the margin, the government would like to tax 
profits  at a rate of  100 percent, thereby allowing other distortionary taxes to be reduced. When the tax 
authority does not distinguish between profits and other types of capital income (as we assume), then 
the capital tax can also function as a tax on profits, but one with an endogenous upper bound. We show 
that the strength of this "profit effect" depends on the structure of dividend taxation. If profits are taxed 
at both the firm level and the household level (in what is called a double-taxation-of-dividends  policy), 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9510.pdfthen the capital tax collects a large fraction of  revenue from profits. This strengthens the profit effect 
and motivates the government to choose a higher capital tax for a given level of  monopoly profits. 
Our model allows for a rich set of possibilities regarding the optimal steady-state tax on capital 
income. For example, if  the profit effect is stronger than the underinvestment effect, then the optimal 
tax  rate is positive. This result complements recent research by  Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi  (1993), 
Aiyagari (1 994), and ~rnrohoro~lu  (1994), who provide alternative theoretical justifications for a positive 
optimal tax rate on capital in the long run. If the profit effect exactly cancels the underinvestment effect, 
then the optimal tax rate can be zero even in an economy without perfect competition. If profits can be 
completely taxed away by some separate instrument (or if the firm's fixed costs imply zero profits), then 
the underinvestment effect will still remain and the optimal tax rate is negative. The perfect competition 
result obtained by  Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) represents a special case of  our model, in which 
neither of the two effects described above is present. 
The ambiguity regarding the sign of the optimal long-run capital tax is directly analogous to the 
findings of  Stiglitz  and  Dasgupta (1971). They  find that  the  optimal commodity  tax  policy  for  a 
monopolistic industry with profits will generally include both differential taxes and subsidies. The link 
between differential commodity taxation and  the capital tax  in  our model  is very  direct; a positive 
(negative) capital tax  implies that future consumption goods are taxed  at a higher (lower) rate than 
present consumption goods. 
Given the inconclusive nature of  the theory, we  undertake a quantitative assessment of  the 
optimal tax policy in a calibrated version of  our model. When the profit-to-output ratio is 5 percent (a 
typical value for U.S.  manufacturing industries), we find that the optimal steady-state tax  on capital 
income can range between  -6 percent and  24 percent, depending on the level of  dividend taxation. 
Similarly, we  find that the available welfare gain of switching from the existing U.S. tax policy to a 
revenue-neutral optimal tax policy can range between 0.8 percent and 3.9 percent of steady-state output. 
Higher levels of  dividend taxation  imply lower welfare gains because revenue that  was previously 
obtained by  a tax on profits must now be replaced with a higher distortionary tax on labor. Thus, our 
results suggest that previous estimates regarding the benefits of  reducing the U.S  capital tax may  be 
overstated. 
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3, we derive the expressions that determine the optimal steady-state tax on capital income. Sections 4 
and 5 discuss computation issues and the choice of parameter values. Section 6 presents our quantitative 
results, and section 7 concludes. 
2.  The Model 
The model economy consists of  three types of  agents: households, firms, and the government. 
The production environment differs from the standard competitive framework used by Judd (1985) and 
Chamley (1986). In particular, we allow for the possibility that intermediate goods producers possess 
monopoly power. This implies that firms can realize positive economic profits even though the final- 
goods sector of  the economy is perfectly competitive. As owners of  the firms, households receive net 
profits  in  the  form  of  dividends.  Various  options  regarding  the  taxation  of  these  dividends  are 
considered. 
2.1  The Household's Problem 
There is a large number of  identical, infinitely lived households, each of  which maximizes a 
stream of  discounted utilities over sequences of  consumption and leisure: 
The within-period utility function U  ( -)  is increasing in private consumption c, and decreasing 
in hours worked h,. The parameter  P is the constant discount factor. The function V( -)  is increasing 
in  g,,  where g,  represents  per  capita  public  consumption goods  which  are determined outside  of 
households' control. Both U  ( .) and V( -)  are assumed to be continuously differentiable, bounded, and 
concave. The additive separability in g, implies that public consumption does not affect the marginal 
utility of private consumption, a specification supported by parameter estimates in McGrattan, Rogerson, 
and  Wright  (1993). Although  this  specification is  not  necessary  for  our  results,  it  simplifies the 
computations because V( .)  can be ignored when deriving the household optimization conditions. 
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where x, is private investment, kt is private capital, and b,,  represents one-period, real government bonds 
canied into period t+l by  the household. Households derive income by  supplying labor and capital 
services to firms at rental rates w,  and r,. Two additional sources of household income are the firm's 
net profits ft,, which are distributed to households as dividends, and the interest earned on government 
bonds rb,  b, . 
We impose a restriction that prevents the government from taxing away monopoly profits. In 
particular, we  assume that the tax  authority does not distinguish between profits and other types of 
capital income. As a result, the tax on capital income also functions as a tax on profits, but one with an 
endogenous upper bound. This scenario is reflected in equation (2), where net profits A,, capital rental 
income r, kt, and bond interest rbt  b,  are all taxed at the same rate zk,  . Labor income is taxed at the rate 
z,,  . The term  ST, kt represents a depreciation allowance, where 6 is the constant depreciation rate. 
Households view tax rates, wages, interest rates, and dividends as determined outside their control. 
The following equation describes the law of motion for the capital stock: 
The household first-order conditions with respect to the indicated variables and the associated 
transversality conditions (TVC) are: 
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where  A,  is  the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with  the  budget  constraint  (2).  The  transversality 
conditions ensure that (2) can be transformed into an infinite-horizon, present-value budget constraint. 
2.2  Production Environment 
Our description of the production environment closely follows the model developed by Benhabib 
and Farmer (1994). There exists a continuum of intermediate goods y,  ,  i E [O, I], and a unique final good 
y, that is produced using the following constant-returns-to-scale technology: 
Final-goods producers choose y,  in order to maximize profits: y, - I,'  pi, yiI di, where pi, is the 
relative price of the i th intermediate good.  Profit maximization implies pi, = (y,  Iy,) X-l,  which is the 
demand function for intermediate goods. When x < 1, intermediate goods producers perceive a downward 
sloping demand curve. In this case, the firm earns an economic profit that is distributed to households 
in  the form  of  dividends. When  x = 1, however,  intermediate goods  are  perfect  substitutes in  the 
production of the final good, and the intermediate sector becomes perfectly competitive. The technology 
for producing intermediate goods is given by 
where  kit and  hi,  are the  capital  and  labor  inputs  of  the  ith firm.  The decision problem  of  an 
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subject to:  pi  = (y  I  y  ,  yi, = kir  hi:-'. 
In  (7),  we  allow  for  the  possibility  that  the  firm's  profits  may  be  taxed  directly.  The 
government's use of the tax rate T,,  for this purpose implies that the tax authority does not distinguish 
between households  and firms when assessing taxes on capital income. As before, this ensures that 
profits will not be completely taxed away. When y= 2, profits are initially taxed at the firm level and 
then taxed  again as dividends at the household level. We refer to this case as a double taxation of 
dividends policy. When y= 1, dividends are taxed only at household level. When y= 0, the effective 
tax rate on dividends is zero. In reduced form, the y =  0  case can be viewed as capturing the possibility 
that the tax authority does not observe monopoly profits. The first-order conditions from (7) are: 
r, =  X a  Pit Yi, 
kit 
9 
Restricting our attention to a symmetric equilibrium implies kit  =  k, ,  hit =  h, ,  and pi, =p,  ,  for all 
i. In this case, (5) and (6) imply that the aggregate production function is 
The assumption that the final-goods sector is perfectly competitive implies y, - I,'  pi, yi, di = 0. 
Substituting yi, =pi:-X  y,  into this expression and applying symmetry yields pi, =p,  = 1. Equations (8a) 
and (8b) can then be used to obtain the following expressions for the equilibrium rental rate on capital 
and the real wage: 
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implied by  equation (9).  The after-tax profits in the intermediate-goods sector are given by: 
2.3  The Government's Problem 
The government chooses an optimal program of taxes, borrowing, and public expenditures to 
maximize the discounted utility of the household. To avoid time inconsistency problems, we assume that 
the government can commit to a sequence of  policies announced at t =  0.  Following the approach of 
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994a), we further assume that 7,'  and r,  are specified exogenously such 
that tax revenue collected at t =  0 cannot finance all future expenditures. If the initial levy on private- 
sector assets is sufficiently large, then the government chooses zh,=  z,  =  0 for some t > ;.  This case is 
not very interesting because after period ;,  the model looks identical to one with lump-sum taxes. In per 
capita terms, the government's budget constraint in period t is 
gl + bl(l+rbt)  = bt+,  +zhtwrht  + rkt[(rt-6)kl  + rbrbr]  + [l-(l-zkt)'](l-~)yt'  (I2) 
The summation of the household budget constraint (2) and the government budget constraint (12) 
yields the following per capita resource constraint for the economy: 
Because the resource constraint and the government budget constraint are not independent equations, 
equation (13) can be used in place of (12) in formulating the government's problem. 
As a condition for equilibrium, government policy must take into account the rational responses 
of the private sector, as summarized by (2), (3), (4), (lo), and (1 1). These equations can be conveniently 
summarized by  the following "implementability constraint": 
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into the present-value household budget constraint.'  Since z,  and r,  are specified exogenously, the 
government's problem can be represented as choosing a set of allocations c,, h,, g,, and kt+,  ,  for all t 
to maximize  household utility  (1) subject to  (13) and  (14), with  A,= Uc (c,, h,). Given the  optimal 
allocations, the appropriate set of prices r, and w, ,  and policy variables zh,  ,  z,,,  and r,,  that decentralize 
them can be computed using the profit-maximization conditions (lo), the household first-order conditions 
(4), and the household budget constraint (2). For example, the optimal allocations define h, and w, from 
equations (4a) and (lob). Given h, and w,, (4b) defines the government's  optimal choice for z,,  . 
The government's problem can be written as 
subject to 
g,  = Y, - c, -kt+,  + k,(l-S), 
y,  = kta h,'-a ,  (15) 
A,  = Uc(c,,h,), 
with  k,,  b,,  z,,  and  r,  given.  The  Lagrange  multiplier  A  associated  with  (14)  is  determined 
endogenously at t =  0 and is constant over time. 
Since the government's problem for t 2  1 is recursive, the solution for t 2  1 can be characterized 
 o ore specifically, equation (14) is obtained as follows: Multiply both sides of the household budget constraint (2) by A,, 
substitute in (4a)-(44, (lo), and (1 I), iterate the resulting expression forward and sum over time, and then apply the transversality 
conditions (4e). 
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A,(  s, ,  A ), where s, ={kt ,  A,-, } . Given these decision rules, a stationary decision rule for the government 
bond allocation b,+,  ( sf,  A ) can be computed as the solution to the following recursive equation: 
I-I  r 
Xay,.,Ik,.,  -6 
~uh~cf+l~h~+l~hf+l~'t+~(  ) (1-~)~t+1+'1+1(k1+2+b1+2) 
Equation  (16) is the  household  budget  constraint at  t+l after substituting in  the first-order 
conditions of  the private sector. At  t = 0, the government chooses c ,  ,  h, ,  go, k, , and A,.  The t =  0 
allocations, together with the stationary decision rules for t21, determine A for a given set of  initial 
conditions.' 
3.  The Optimal Steady-State Tax on Capital Income 
In this section, we derive some expressions to show how the optimal steady-state tax on capital 
income  zk* depends  on  the  level  of  profits  and  the  degree  to  which  profits  can  be  taxed.  The 
government's first-order condition with respect to k,,  from (15) is 
Omitting time subscripts and dividing by  P yields the following steady-state version of equation 
(17), where p = 1 / P - 1 is the rate of time preference. 
In steady state, the household's first-order condition with respect to kt+,  ,  equation (4c), can be 
written as: 
2~ee  Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994a.b) for more details regarding the solution of the government's problem. 
9 
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expression to (19) implies z,'=O,  which is the result obtained by  Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). 
When x < 1, however, there are two competing effects that interact to determine 7,'.  First, the rental rate 
on capital r  which governs household investment decisions is now less than the marginal product of 
capital rl~.  This effect is reflected in the first term of  (18) and implies that households underinvest 
relative to the socially optimal level. To correct this inefficiency, the government can subsidize capital 
accumulation by  choosing 7,'  <  0. The second term in (1  8) represents an offsetting effect that is driven 
by the level of profits and the degree to which profits can be taxed. Since profits do not affect household 
decisions at the margin, the government would like to tax profits as much as possible to obtain non- 
distortionary revenue. Choosing 7,'  >  0 accomplishes this objective in varying degrees, depending on the 
value of  y.  As y increases, the capital tax collects a larger fraction of  revenue from profits. As the 
quantitative analysis will show, this fact motivates the government to choose a higher capital tax and 
a lower labor tax for a given value of X. 
Since x appears in both the first and second terms of (18), theoretical conclusions regarding the 
sign of 7,'  cannot be made except in the special case of x = 1. Depending on the relative importance of 
the  two  effects,  the  optimal  steady-state  tax  on  capital  can  be  positive,  negative,  or  zero.  The 
underinvestment effect may not be present if profits derive from a different source, such as productive 
government expenditures. In this case, Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) show that the incentive to tax 
profits (the profit effect) implies that the optimal steady-state tax on capital is positive. 
4. Computation Procedure 
Given the inconclusive nature of the theory, we now turn to a quantitative assessment of the 
optimal capital tax in a calibrated version of our model. The steady-state allocations implied by  (15) 
depend on parameter values (which are described below) and the endogenous Lagrange multiplier A, 
which is computed as follows. First, given an initial guess for A, we compute the steady-state allocations 
c, h, g, k, and h from the first-order conditions of (15) with respect to c,, h,, g,, k,,  ,  and 1,.  We then 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9510.pdfuse the steady-state version of (15) to compute the steady-state level of government debt b. We repeat 
this procedure, adjusting A until we obtain a desired ratio of steady-state debt to output. The initial level 
of debt b,  that is consistent with A and b can be computed using the first-order conditions of (15) with 
respect to c, ,  h, ,  go,  k, ,  and h, ,  together with the stationary decision rules for t 2  1, the household 
budget constraint (2) evaluated at t =  0 and t = 1, and the initial conditions k,  ,  z,  ,  and r, . 
Once the optimal steady-state allocations are known, we use (lOa), (lob), (4b), and (4c) to 
determine the optimal steady-state tax policy {z;  ,  7;  } that decentralizes the allocations. This procedure 
is repeated over  a range of  values for x  and y.  In  each  case,  we compute the welfare loss  from 
switching to a "naive" policy that sets z,  =  0 and adjusts z,  to achieve the same levels of g and b as the 
optimal policy. We also compute the welfare gain of switching from the existing U.S. tax policy to an 
optimal policy, again holding the levels of g and b ~onstant.~  We use the steady-state level of  the 
household's  within-period  utility  function  as our  basic  welfare  measure. This  facilitates  a  simple 
comparison between our results and those of Lucas (1990) and Cooley and Hansen (1992), who consider 
the welfare effects of capital taxation in models with zero profits. Since a time period in the model is 
taken to be one year (consistent with the frequency of most government fiscal decisions), the change in 
steady-state utility across policies can be readily translated into an annual gain or loss and expressed as 
percentage of total output. 
A more comprehensive welfare analysis would obviously need to take into account the dynamic 
transition between steady states. However, during the first period of the transition, the government in 
our model has a strong incentive to impose a heavy tax on the existing stock of household assets in 
order to minimize distortions. Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994a) show that the welfare gains from 
this initial levy tend to dominate any differences between final steady  state^.^ Although this scenario 
provides an interesting motivation for tax reform, it is doubtful that confiscatory taxes of this kind are 
3~n  particular, we follow the approach of Lucas (1990) and assume that  the net change in debt is zero along the transition 
path between steady states. This implies that tax rates along the transition path are set such that the implementability constraint 
is satisfied. Alternatively, we could assume that  lump-sum taxes are available during the first period of the transition to satisfy 
the implementability constraint. See Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994b) for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
kven  though 7,  is specified exogenously, z,,  tends to be much higher than the optimal steady-state value z,'.  In  addition, 
the large positive value of z,,  typically implies z,,,  c  0. 
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alternative approach to transitional dynamics by  assuming that shifts in tax rates between steady states 
are exogenous. They obtain a quite different result--that transitions involve a welfare loss. This loss 
reduces the available gains from moving to a more desirable steady state. Given the many ways in which 
transitions can be modeled, we  have chosen to abstract from these issues and report results only from 
steady-state welfare  analysis. Our results  must  therefore be  qualified to the  extent  that  transitions 
between steady states produce significant benefits or costs. 
5. Calibration 
Parameters are assigned values based on empirically observed features of postwar U.S. data. The 
discount factor p (= 0.962) implies a real rate of  interest of 4 percent. The household's within-period 
utility function is specified as 
where the linearity in hours worked draws on the formulation of indivisible labor described by Rogerson 
(1988) and Hansen (1985). This means that all fluctuations in total labor hours are due to changes in 
the number of  workers employed, as opposed to variations in  hours per  worker.'  The parameter A 
(= 2.48) is chosen such that the fraction of  time spent working is approximately equal to 0.3. The value 
of B (= 0.346) is chosen to yield a steady-state ratio g ly  close to 0.22. The private capital depreciation 
rate  6  (=0.067)  is  estimated  by  a least-squares  regression of  x, - (k,,  - k,) on  kt .6  The  Lagrange 
multiplier A is set to  achieve a steady-state ratio bly  =0.37 under  the  optimal policy. This is the 
average level of  U.S. federal debt held by  the public as a fraction of  GNP from  1954 to  1992. The 
steady-state values of  g and b  under the optimal policy are then used as exogenous inputs to compute 
the steady-state allocations under the z,  = 0 policy. 
'~n  postwar U.S. data, about two-thirds of the variance in total hours is due to changes in the number of workers. See 
Kydland and Prescott (1990). 
%e  capital and investment series are in 1987 dollars from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1993). The series for k, and x,  include business equipment and  structures, consumer durables, and 
residential components. The "capital input" measure of the net stock was used for all capital data. 
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we follow Cooley and Hansen (1992) and take U.S tax policy to be z,  =  0.50 and z,  =  0.23. The steady- 
state level of government debt under the U.S. policy is specified exogenously such that b /y  =  0.37. We 
then determine the steady-state value of g as a residual such that the government budget constraint (12) 
is satisfied. To compute 7,'  and 7,'  under the revenue-neutral optimal policy, we  adjust the Lagrange 
multiplier A to achieve the same level of steady-state debt as the U.S policy and treat the required level 
of government spending g as an exogenous constraint.' 
We examine a range of  values for the parameter X,  which determines the steady-state ratio of 
monopoly profits to output. The profit ratio s,  is  linked to the markup of price over marginal cost 
according to the formula 
where v represents the degree of returns to scale in the intermediate-goods sector. Our use of a constant- 
returns-to-scale specification in  (6) implies v = 1 and  s,=  1-X. Using  data on  U.S. manufacturing 
industries over the period 1953-1985, Basu and Femald (1994a) obtain a point estimate of v = 1.03, but 
this is not statistically different from 1. Basu and Fernald (1994b) find that the typical manufacturing 
industry has an average profit ratio of  about 0.05. Based on these results, we choose x =0.95 as our 
baseline value, which implies p / mc = 1.05. In the computations, we examine profits ratios over the range 
0  to 0.13. 
The  shares of  total  output received  by  capital  and  labor in  the  model  are Xa  and ~(1-a), 
respectively. Given the baseline value of X, we set a  =  0.34 such that capital's share is 0.32 and labor's 
share is 0.63. These values lie within the ranges estimated by  Christian0 (1988) for the postwar U.S. 
economy. Finally, since dividends are subject to double taxation under the U.S. tax code, we  choose 
y = 2 as our baseline. 
7  The government's first-order conditions from (1'5) must be modified slightly for this experiment to allow for the fact that 
g, under the optimal policy is no longer endogenous. This can be done very simply by replacing the marginal utility of public 
consumption V, (g,)  with &, where & is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint (13). 
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Table 1 and figures 1-3 show the optimal steady-state tax rates over a range of profit ratios and 
degrees of  dividend taxation. When  1-x =  0, figures  1-3 each indicate that 7,'  =  0, consistent with the 
results of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). Figure 1 shows that when dividends are not taxed (y= 0), 
2,'  becomes increasingly negative as the profit ratio rises. In this case, the underinvestment effect from 
the first  term  in  equation (18) dominates the profit  effect associated with the second  term.  At  the 
baseline profit ratio, the model implies 2,'  = -0.057 (see table 1). When y equals 1 or  2, however, the 
profit effect dominates and 7,'  becomes increasingly positive  as the profit ratio rises (figures 2 and 3). 
Moreover, table 1 shows that higher values of y cause 7,'  to increase relative to 7;. As noted earlier, 
a higher y implies that the capital tax collects a larger fraction of revenue from profits. Since profits do 
not distort household decisions, this calls for a higher capital tax, thereby allowing the distortionary tax 
on labor to be reduced. 
At the baseline values of  1-x = 0.05 and y =  2, table 1 indicates that the optimal tax policy is 
2,'  =  0.236 and 7,'  =  0.279. It is interesting to compare these values to some tax rate estimates for the 
U.S. economy. Jorgenson and Sullivan (1'981) estimate an average effective corporate tax rate of 0.30 
for the period 1947-1980. Barro and Sahasakul (1986) estimate an average marginal tax rate on labor 
income of  0.27 for the period  1947-1983. Sample average estimates by  McGrattan, Rogerson, and 
Wright (1993) are zk = 0.57 and zh  =  0.23 for the period  1947-87, while Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar 
(1994) estimate zk =  0.43 and zh  = 0.25 over the period  1965-1988. In general, the U.S.  tax rate on 
capital income appears to be higher than the optimal value of 7,'  =  0.236 implied by our baseline model. 
However, we note that our model abstracts from some important considerations which, if taken into 
account, could increase the optimal tax rate on capital to a value which is closer to U.S. estimates. Jones, 
Manuelli and Rossi (1993) show that rents associated with productive public goods can give rise to a 
positive optimal tax rate on capital in the long run. In models without profits, Aiyagari (1994) and 
~mrohoroglu  (1994) show that a positive optimal tax rate can also be obtained by introducing borrowing 
constraints and idiosyncratic income shocks among heterogeneous agents. 
Figure 4 plots the welfare cost of switching to a naive policy that sets zk =  0 and maintains g 
and b at the levels implied by  the optimal policy. The welfare cost increases rapidly as a function of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9510.pdfprofits when y= 2, but stays very close to zero when y= 0. This shows that the structure of  dividend 
taxation can have dramatic effects on household welfare. This is not surprising, since changes in y affect 
the government's ability to obtain nondistortionary revenue by means of a tax on profits.'  Starting from 
the baseline optimal policy, the welfare cost of eliminating the capital tax is about 1.6 percent of total 
output (see table 1). This figure translates to an annual loss of  $407 per person in 1994.' 
In models without profits, Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992), and McGrattan, Rogerson, 
and  Wright  (1993) all estimate large available gains from eliminating the U.S.  capital income tax. 
Excluding transitional dynamics, Lucas reports that steady-state consumption increases by  4.2 percent, 
while McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright report an increase of  9 percent. Cooley and Hansen report a 
welfare gain of  7.8 percent of  steady-state o~tput.'~  Table 2 computes the available welfare gains of 
switching from  the  existing U.S.  tax  policy  to  an  optimal policy,  holding  revenue  constant.  The 
requirement to maintain revenue neutrality pushes up the optimal tax rates in comparison to the values 
reported earlier in table 1. 
In table 2, the available gains depend crucially on the value of  y. When y= 0, the gains are 
large, equal to 3.88 percent of  steady-state output. In this case, the U.S. policy of  z,  = 0.50 is very far 
from the optimal policy of  7,'  =  0.016. When y equals 1 or 2, however, the available welfare gains are 
less than 1 percent of  steady-state output. The gains are much lower in these two cases because revenue 
that was previously obtained by  a tax on profits must now be replaced with a higher tax on labor. If tax 
rates are considered to be exogenous during the transition between steady states, then these welfare gains 
are likely to be even lower, and could even turn into welfare losses. This experiment shows that previous 
claims regarding the benefits of reducing the U.S. capital tax may be overstated. 
'see Guo and Lansing (1995) for a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of tax structure on household welfare. 
 his number is based on a nominal GNP of $6,729 billion and total U.S. population of 260.7 million in 1994. 
''TO  compute these gains, Lucas uses a value of 0.36 for the U.S. tax rate on capital income, while McGrattan, Rogerson, 
and Wright use 0.57, and Cooley and Hansen use 0.50. 
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This  paper  has  shown that  the  introduction  of  monopoly  power  in  an  otherwise  standard 
neoclassical growth model creates a theoretical ambiguity regarding the sign of the optimal steady-state 
tax on capital income. The optimal tax rate in the long run can be positive, negative, or zero, depending 
on the relative strength of two competing forces, which we label as the underinvestment effect and the 
profit effect. In particular, the underinvestment effect supports the use of a negative tax rate on capital 
income to induce monopolistic firms to produce the socially optimal level of output. The profit effect 
supports the use of  a positive tax rate on capital income to minimize distortions in the financing of 
government spending. 
In the quantitative section of  the paper,  we found that empirically plausible  values for the 
model's parameters imply that the profit effect dominates such that the optimal tax rate is positive. In 
applying our model to the important policy question of whether or not the U.S. capital tax should be 
reduced, we found that the welfare gains from such a policy can be large or small, depending on the 
structure of  dividend taxation. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9510.pdfTable 1:  Optimal Steady-State Tax Rates and Welfare Comparison with z,  =  0 Policy 
Profit Ratio = 1-x =  0.05  I  Profit Ratio = 1-x =  0.10 
Labor tax 
with 2,  =  0 
Variable  y=O  y=  1  y=2 
2,'  -0.057  0.188  0.236 
7;  0.346  0.301  0.279 
y=O  y=  1  y=2 
-0.088  0.293  0.315 
0.357  0.267  0.232 
a~he  welfare loss is defined as AUl(hy), where AU  is the change in  steady-state utility and h and y are the 
steady-state values associated with the optimal policy. 
Welfare loss 
0.079  %  0.500  %  1.576 % 
from 2,  =  0 policya 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
0.059  %  3.452  %  7.731  % 
Table 2:  Available Welfare Gains from Reducing U.S. Capital Tax 
Profit Ratio = 1-x =  0.05 
Variable  y=O  y=  1  y=2 
2,'  (new policy) 
2,'  (new policy) 
Welfare change 
from U.S. policy of 
2,  =  0.50 and 2,  =  0.23a 
a~he  welfare change is defined as AUl(hy ),  where AU = U,,,  - U,,  and h and y are the steady-state values 
associated with the U.S. policy. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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